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1 INTRODUCTION 
The reform of public transport introduced in the Netherlands in 2001 is showing its first 
interesting results as about two third of the country (excluding the four largest agglom-
erations) has now been submitted to competitive tendering. Differently from many 
competitive regimes introduced in other parts of Europe, the Dutch regime aims at 
stimulating innovation in public transport. To this effect, a new passenger transport leg-
islation allows the transport authorities to give operators the possibility to re-design the 
transport services (routes, timetables, fares, vehicles, etc.) during competitive tendering 
and/or during the contract period. As presented in earlier papers (van de Velde and Lei-
jenaar, 2001; van de Velde and Pruijmboom, 2005), these legislator’s aims are not nec-
essarily easy to fulfil as various factual, informational or behavioural barriers can stand 
in the way of such arrangements. 
Van de Velde and Pruijmboom (2005) present three of the first experiences with com-
petitive tendering in the Netherlands based on facts dating back to 2002/2003. That pa-
per focussed on the allocation of the tactical level (service design) between transport 
authority and transport operator2. Its originality consisted in attempting to identify the 
 
1 Preliminary version of the paper. Please do not quote without consulting the authors. The analysis and conclusions 
drawn in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the transport authorities presented in this 
paper. 
2 The concept of ‘tactical level’ relates to the distinction between strategic, tactical and operational level in planning 
and control of passenger transport services. See Van de Velde (1999) for a presentation of these concepts and further 
details. 
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reasons used by the various authorities to make specific choices in favour or against the 
allocation of tactical freedoms to the operators.  
This paper reviews a few of the opposite evolutions that can be observed in these prac-
tices since this first analysis. Besides presenting the essential features of the cases stud-
ied, the paper concentrates on the reasons that have led transport authorities to these 
opposite choices in terms of allocation of service design power between operator and 
authority in a second tendering round. The paper draws conclusions on the various (in-
stitutional) aspects that may have lead to these evolutions and sets a few questions for 
the future of the Dutch regime. 
2 OVERVIEW OF MAIN DEVELOPMENTS 
The introduction of tendering procedures outside the four largest agglomerations started 
slightly slower than anticipated. By the end of 2003 one third instead of the planned 
40% of the concessions were tendered. 75 concession areas were defined in August 
2004, out of which 5 were urban rail concessions. 23 of the 70 non-urban rail conces-
sions were submitted to competitive tendering by 2004. 22 more concessions have been 
submitted to competitive tendering since 2004, but some of the concessions have been 
split or merged during this period. As per September 2005 already two third has been 
tendered and many other areas procedures are in preparation. In the largest agglomera-
tions no procedures have been started as far as it is related to concessions from the mu-
nicipally owned companies.  
The WP2000 was amended in 2005. This happened in two steps. The first step con-
cerned all concessions with exception of the concessions granted to the municipally 
owned companies in the four largest agglomerations. The amendments were based on 
the result of an evaluation process on the developments in the first years of the new re-
gime. This evaluation process had been planned from the start. Amendments in the first 
step were relatively small and the introduction of competition is planned more or less to 
continue in this market segment as originally planned.  
The second step concerned the remaining concessions. The timetable for the introduc-
tion of competition in the concessions currently granted to municipal operators in the 4 
large agglomerations has been extended. Authorities are now required to tender the bus 
concessions by 2009 or—in case a majority of the shares of the municipal operators are 
sold before 2007 to a third party—by 2012 and the rail concessions by 2017, under the 
condition that a benchmarking exercise in 2009 shows progress in performances. Am-
sterdam has been allowed to tender for an integral concession by 2012. Other changes 
include the possibility of a longer duration of a concession for rail services. Neverthe-
less the objective of tendering urban rail services at some stage in the future has been 
maintained, be it that the horizon has shifted to 2017. 
Out of the 19 passenger transport authorities, 15 have currently used competitive tender-
ing procedures to allocate passenger transport concessions; the other four are currently 
preparing their first tendering procedures.  
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3 CASES 
The allocation of tactical powers to the operators is in evolution and opposite tendencies 
can currently be observed. Initially, most Dutch passenger transport authorities intro-
ducing competitive tendering seemed to choose for organisational forms that allocated 
little or no service design freedom to the operators. In reinforcement of this, some au-
thorities, who had initially given substantial service design freedom to their operators, 
have decided in a second tendering round to take this power away from the operators, 
confirming a trend that could be observed elsewhere in the country. This development 
leads a wider usage of variations on the so-called ‘Scandinavian model’ in the Dutch 
public transport landscape. Other authorities, on the contrary, have in their second ten-
dering rounds decided to give operators more service design freedom than in their first 
contracting period. 
We have selected for this paper four cases of competitive tendering that we believe to 
be illustrative of the divergent evolutions that can currently be observed in the Dutch 
public transport concessioning practice. In all four cases, the transport authorities have 
organised at least their second competitive tendering round, allowing us to describe and 
attempt to analyse their choices and behavioural evolution in terms of allocation of the 
tactical level to authority and operator. Where this was possible, we compare practices 
between first and second tendering for the same transport area. In those areas where the 
first competitively allocated concession has not yet expired, we compare the choices 
made by that transport authority between earlier concessioning and current concession-
ing of comparable areas under its jurisdiction. 
Two of the four cases represent an increase of service design powers for the operators. 
These are the cases North-Holland and South-Holland. But, as we will see, these two 
cases diverge substantially in their implementation. The two other cases represent a de-
crease of service design powers for the operators. These are the cases of North-Brabant 
and Groningen-Drenthe. Here too, we will see that divergent solutions have been im-
plemented. 
3.1 Tactical level shifting towards the operator 
3.1.1 North Holland 
The concession North Holland North was for the first time submitted to competitive 
tendering in 2002 (start of operation on 15 December 2002). The incumbent—
Connexxion—won this concession that gave the operator only limited tactical powers. 
Even though ridership growth had been one of the bid evaluation criteria, the cost aspect 
(for the production of the pre-determined timetable-hours) had been the main selection 
factor. The contract includes a bonus/malus on punctuality and ridership growth. 
The Provincial council had a preference, at the time, for an arrangement that prescribed 
the network in detail. A network restructuration had taken place only one year before 
the invitation to tender as a consequence of a budget reduction unexpectedly imposed 
by central government. This had led to reduction of frequencies and the discontinuation 
of several lines. Due to this, further network restructurations were seen as unwelcome. 
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The contract allowed some room for experimentation by the operator, but the contours 
where largely prescribed in advance. All of these experiments have been discontinued in 
the past years upon the initiative of the Provincial administration. Connexxion happily 
agreed to this because of the expected relatively high costs and low ridership. As the 
contract gives little incentives for the operator to improve or promote services, the op-
erator did indeed little to market his product. 
The approach chosen for the tenders organised in 2005 (concessions Haarlem/IJmond 
and Gooi en Vechtstreek) was therefore substantially different compared to the experi-
ence in North Holland North. The preference of the majority of the Provincial council 
has changed, and now supports the strategy from the Provincial administration to allo-
cate the tactical level clearly on the side of the operator whereby the province focuses 
on the efficient and fair allocation of the public transport budget, while the operator 
focuses on the development of cost-effective services that fulfil passenger demand. This 
choice was argumented by the observation that operators are better able to identify de-
mand due to their daily contacts with passengers. The Provincial administration came to 
the conclusion that the approach used in this first tender round laid a rather heavy toll on 
its workload in terms of preparation of the call for tender, required expensive and time-
consuming research, forcing them to make all kind of tactical and operational decisions 
which, they believe, should actually be made by the operator. Furthermore, it entailed 
continuing negotiations with operators during contract execution (Provincie Noord-
Holland, 2004). 
The province wanted to stimulate operators to come up with creative solutions that lead 
to more ridership and more customer satisfaction. Minimum requirements were only set 
there where the province felt that the interests of specific traveller groups might other-
wise be endangered. ‘Functional demands’ were formulated on the basis of attraction 
points (origin and destination areas). Public transport profiles were described for each 
type of attraction point. Every profile describes the minimum service level that has to be 
available, the required connections with other areas and attraction points, the maximum 
walking distance to stops, the service period, the frequencies and intervals These re-
quirements define a basic service level that is lower than the existing service level, but 
that is based on identical norms throughout the whole area such as to avoid preferential 
treatment. The operator is then free to design routes, frequencies, etc for as much as the 
minimum service level is provided. 
Financial incentives are included and aimed at maximising ridership. All ticket revenues 
remain with the operator. Growth in revenue and increased customer satisfaction lead to 
bonuses. The rationale is to force the operator to take the passenger’s perception into 
account rather than having the province prescribing in detail what they think passengers 
want. Such an approach too often leads to a too simple focus on describing such rational 
factors such as frequencies or travelling time, but ignores more complicated ‘soft’ fac-
tors such as comfort or travel experience (Langzaam verkeer, 2003). 
The market consultation which was undertaken in the summer of 2005 to consult opera-
tors about the approach confirmed that the approach chosen was welcomed by the po-
tential operators and that it stimulates entrepeneurship. The five consulted operators 
gave a lot of information that helped to improve the tendering and where mostly very 
positive about the approach and quality of the concept Program of Demands.     
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Both concessions will start operations in December 2005. Both were again won by the 
incumbent operator Connexxion. Whereas the operator in the concession North Holland 
North limited its actions to some fare actions and timetable changes, the (same) operator 
now promises more actions in the new concession areas. These include suggestions by 
the operator to improve commercial speed, improve quality by increasing frequencies, 
implementing air conditioned busses and special high comfort busses on longer dis-
tances and a new approach to service marketing by, for example, introducing different 
brands for different bus products in the region. 
It is now perceived by the Province to be unlikely that the operator will engage in ‘stra-
tegic behaviour’ due to the substantial bonus-malus on passenger growth and costumer 
satisfaction included in the concession text, and the personal commitment from man-
agement of the transport company that was expressed. It will, however, be necessary to 
wait one or two years to be able to draw conclusions on this new approach. 
3.1.2 South Holland 
The ‘Drechtsteden-Alblasserwaard-Vijfheerenlanden’ (DAV) area of the Province of 
South-Holland, located south-east of the city of Rotterdam, counts 14 municipalities and 
covers 385 km2. It represents about 15% of the total volume of public transport under 
the responsibility of the province. It was tendered for the first time in 2002 for a conces-
sion period lasting from 1 January 2003 until 1 January 2007. The main average charac-
teristics for the period 2002-2005 are: 200.000 timetable-hours, 80 million passenger-
kms, 6 million Euro revenues from ticket sales and a yearly lump sum subsidy from the 
province to the operator of about 11.4 million Euro (all garages and vehicles being 
owned by the operator). A second area was tendered in the same period under slightly 
different conditions. 
The relatively short four year concession period was chosen to allow a new geographi-
cal division of concession areas made necessary by external factors. As the neighbour-
ing city of Dordrecht will loose its status of independent transport authority, this area 
will be added to this concession in 2007. Furthermore, the regional railway line 
Dordrecht-Geldermalsen, that was not yet decentralized from the Ministry to the Prov-
ince in 2002, will also be included to form a multi-modal concession in 2007. 
The authority did not give much tactical freedom to the operator during the 2002 tender-
ing round. However, the concession text gave the operator the freedom to modify the 
network after the first year of operations under the conditions that the total number of 
bus-hours was not reduced, that passenger growth was the main aim of the proposed 
changes and that consumer organizations had been consulted and had agreed upon the 
proposed changes. 
The following statements can be made, looking back on the achievements of the DAV 
tender after three years of operation: 
● The time between granting the concession (August 2002) and the start of operations 
(1-1-2003) was far too short. The concession changed from one operator to another 
and the new operator could not have the new low-floor buses available at the start of 
the concession. As a consequence of this, very old buses were used for several 
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month, leading to a temporary performance below quality agreement (punctuality, 
comfort and environment). 
● There was a reduction in ticket revenues, resulting in a decrease of cost coverage 
from 36% in 2002 to 34.4% in 2005, in line with the stagnation or reduction trend in 
all concessions in the province in recent years. 
● The operator used its possibility to amend the timetable after the first year of opera-
tions, but this is perceived to have taken place more to optimize supply in terms of 
personnel roster efficiency than in search of new passengers. It resulted in less clear 
frequencies and a partial loss of clockface timetable. Although consumer organisa-
tions were not pleased, the province had no contractual instrument to refuse the 
changes as there is no contractual obligation to maintain clockface timetables. How-
ever, a letter to the operator where the province expressed its concern led the opera-
tor to renegotiate with consumer organisations. As a result, the old timetable was 
more or less re-established after the second year of operation. Two new lines corre-
sponding to long-standing wishes from local authorities were also introduced after 
the first year, but these delivered only very limited ridership growth and were dis-
continued in the next year. The network development vision, which was part of its 
bid, was indeed implemented but led to only disappointing results. The general im-
pression is that, all in all, the freedom given to the operator did not result in the ex-
pected improvements. 
This last point in particular led to the province to develop a new approach for the next 
concession area to be tendered (Duin- en Bollenstreek/Leiden & Rijnstreek/Midden-
Holland, DBLRMH). The limited use made by the operator of the tactical freedom 
granted in the DAV area led the province to devise a regime that should provide the 
operator with more incentives to develop the network by establishing a separate ‘devel-
opment’ budget of € 1 mln besides the general ‘operations’ budget of € 24.4 mln for the 
network to be tendered. The operator receives that additional budget only if actions in 
terms of development of the network (tactical level) can be shown. More freedom was 
given to the operator to design network and timetable at the time of tendering. It is re-
ported that this led to an improved supply and a 20% better value for money in the next 
tendering round. 
In the meantime the second tendering of the DAV-area is being prepared. In view of the 
experience to date, the following changes are expected for the operation period starting 
on 1-1-20073: 
● The area will form a 12 year multimodal concession, including the original DAV-
area, Dordrecht and a railway line. The contribution of the province will be around 
20 million year, making this one of the largest tendered concessions in the Nether-
lands up to now. 
● A time frame of a full year will be reserved between granting the concession and 
start of operations. 
 
3 This may be delayed due to continuing negotiations with the Ministry of Transport around the financial arrange-
ments for the decentralisation of the railway line. In addition to this, uncertainties related to the introduction of the 
(nationwide) chipcard system may also play a role. 
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● More tactical freedom will be given during the tendering procedure, including free-
dom of network design. However, municipalities will be allowed to request mini-
mum service levels. The requirements will be stricter for the railway line, in line 
with the province’s wish to re-enforce the function of this line. 
● The concession awarding procedure will consist out of quantitative indicators (value 
for money) as well as qualitative indicators. 
3.2 Tactical level shifting towards the authority 
3.2.1 GGD Area 
The GGD-region consists of the province of Groningen, the province of Drenthe and the 
city of Groningen. These authorities have decided to co-operate as transport authorities 
due to the large interdependencies between the transport flows located on their territory. 
The first tender in the GGD-region was granted to Arriva. Operations started on 1 June 
2004. Before that date, Arriva was submitted to a performance contract including vari-
ous bonus and malus issues. The operator did not agree to commit itself to ridership 
growth due to the perceived high interdependencies of ridership growth with govern-
ment policies, such as fare policy, collective workings agreement, subsidy levels, land-
use planning decisions and infrastructure investments.  
This point of view from the operator was largely endorsed by the involved provincial 
administrations, though some of the participating civil servants are also disappointed by 
the ‘commercial behaviour’ exhibited by Arriva. Others participating civil servants 
show more understanding for that behaviour and state that: 
● It is clearly in the commercial interest of the operator as he cannot reap the benefits 
of his efforts coming to fruition after the end of the concession period. 
● The vision of the Brokx Committee (which led to the current legislation and the idea 
that the operator should take care of the service development within a competitive 
tendering framework) failed in its analysis and took insufficient account of the roles 
of the parties involved and most logical role partitioning.  
● The current developments, with their strong emphasis on cost reduction, lead to in-
sufficient investments. Efficiency increases, but there is no structural improvement 
to the quality of the services as the creativity of the carrier is limited to operational 
aspects.  
Official documents from the GGD-region state that these interdependencies, the lack of 
perspective and the view that the current legal setting will hamper the development of a 
more market-minded behaviour, all reduce the entrepreneurial space of the transport 
operator to such an extent that the authorities of the GGD-region believe that public 
transport should be organised by the authorities themselves (GGD-overheden, 2004).  
This led them to choosing, for the 2004 tender, to restrict market forces even further 
compared to the previous performance contract. The operator is now limited to that part 
of the decisions that can be taken by an operator on its own without direct interference 
by government, i.e. operations without tactical responsibilities despite the fact that the 
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operator would also like to be responsible for information provision and costumer satis-
faction.  
The co-operating authorities then created a Public Transport Bureau (OV Bureau) to 
carry out most of the authorities’ tasks related to public transport. This bureau is cur-
rently being set up, but it is responsible for service levels, fares, quality and control on 
the operator. The GGD-authorities and municipalities are responsible for traffic speed 
on the road network and other policy measures that have influence on public transport 
attractivity and through which they will try to improve the success of public transport.  
3.2.2 North Brabant 
The first competitive tendering in the province of North Brabant took place in 2001. 
The eastern concession was granted to BBA-Connex4 after competitive tendering. The 
western concession was directly awarded to BBA, at the same conditions as in the east-
ern part, as part of a previously agreed transition path to a competitive regime. The four 
years concessions started on 1-1-2002 with an option for a 2 year extension depending 
on the fulfillment of specific criteria. Three medium size city concessions in the prov-
ince (Breda, Tilburg and ’s-Hertogenbosch) were directly awarded to BBA by these 
respective cities who had the status of independent transport authority at the time. The 
larger urban area of Eindhoven and Helmond, constituting a different regional transport 
authority within the province (Stadsregio Eindhoven, SRE) gave their concessions di-
rectly to BBA and Hermes (a subsidiary of Connexxion). 
Based on the results of a monitoring system the province decided at the end of 2004 not 
to opt for the extension of the concessions. The monitoring system included indicators 
on the process, the performances and the effects. The scores on the indicators on ‘ef-
fects’ were in majority negative. Indicators such as passenger growth and modal-split 
were included here. The operator claimed that the fact that these indicators were below 
contract values could not only be blamed to the operator; the province concluded never-
theless that the results provided sufficient basis to not opt for the prolongation. The 
monitoring process and the conclusions drawn from were essential ‘cultural’ learning 
points for the province: its administration has to learn to deal with contracting parties 
with another behavioral rationale than that of the public service. This may require hiring 
people with skills adequate to devise and enforce commercial contracts besides develop-
ing sensible policies. Also it was a learning point for the operator, as in the past indica-
tors on effects were regarded more as general policy objectives than as strict monitoring 
features with concrete implications.  
Personnel change in the transport administration of the province and at the level of the 
elected official responsible for transport strongly influenced the change in approach. 
Whereas the former administration had engaged into excessively ambitious public 
transport innovation measures that had in the end not generated the expected improve-
ments, the current administration can perhaps be characterized by a more down-to-earth 
 
4 BBA-Connex is the main Dutch subsidiary of Connex. BBA that was previously owned by the province of North 
Brabant (and several local authorities) was sold to Connex prior to the introduction of competitive tendering. BBA-
Connex is often referred to as BBA to avoid confusion with the Dutch operator Connexxion, currently owned by the 
Dutch state. 
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approach. The opinion is that transport operators have not been sufficiently client-
minded in the past. One of the reasons for this is seen to be the historically grown rigidi-
ties in service planning and rostering that, in turn, impair the implementation of service 
optimizations (both in terms of passenger-attractiveness and cost-reduction). For this 
reason, it is thought that the tactical function should perhaps not be located with the 
operators. Externally designed services are then seen as a means to force change on 
structures that have become ossified. Furthermore, the abolition of the urban passenger 
transport authorities led the city concessions of Breda, Tilburg and ’s-Hertogenbosch to 
be handed over to the province, which provided another opportunity for reform. The 
larger SRE area, however, continues to exist as a separate authority. 
The new approach chosen in North Brabant effectively introduces a clear split between 
the strategic, tactical and operational levels. The province remains responsible for the 
strategy (public transport aims defined in the regional transport plan), but a separate 
‘transport architect’ is hired by the province to fulfill the tactical function. The basic 
idea is to add up all existing transport demand and to re-design an ‘optimum network’ 
based on scientific methods of network optimization. This fits with the public transport 
policy promoted by the province and which attempts to overcome product differences 
(local transport, regional transport, demand-responsive services, train-taxi, etc) that 
have appeared over the course of time. For this purpose, a young company specialized 
in such network design was hired to redesign the services on the basis of optimization 
algorithms. The province split its area into 4 geographical concessions, and one longer-
distance express-bus concession for two routes linking the province to the city of 
Utrecht. The five concession packages with pre-defined routes and timetables were then 
put out to tender in 2005, with operations due to start in 2006. 
The operator, limited in this setting to the operations of pre-defined services, is chosen 
through a multi-criteria process. The unit production costs, that also define the price for 
marginal work that may be required when services are redesigned during the concession 
period, have a heavy weight factor within this evaluation. Some parts of the tactical 
function remain, though, on the side of the operator.  It is stated that the knowledge of 
the operator on network and timetable design and operational aspect will be used in the 
process of preparing the annual operational plan. The operator is invited to propose 
every year changes in network and timetable. The decision to implement these propos-
als or not is, however, taken by the authority. The cost of the operator’s personnel that 
will be allocated to these tasks is part of the bids.  
The tactical level itself will within short also be submitted to a competitive tendering 
procedure to provide services of service design and re-design during the concession 
period. It is expected that at least some of the operators will be interested in bidding for 
this contract; note that the company that prepared the first round of network and timeta-
ble is actually a subsidiary of Connexxion. But some of the bidders may actually come 
from other sectors. 
4 ANALYSIS OF SHIFTS 
Whereas legislation in other countries substantially limits local and regional transport 
authorities in their choices of organizational form, one of the essential features of the 
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Dutch public transport concession regime is the substantial leeway given to the 19 pas-
senger transport authorities in this respect. This freedom proves to be substantial, as was 
exemplified by the cases presented above, even if the limits imposed by legislation 
(level L2.1) and regulation (L2.2) hamper the appearance of other organizational forms 
that may be desired by some authorities or that are common in other countries. These 
various institutional levels are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 Institutional levels 
Institutional levels Levels of social analysis 
(Williamson, 2000) 
Institutional setting of public transport (van de Velde and 
Leijenaar, 2001) 
L1 
Embeddedness 
Informal institutions, cus-
toms, traditions,.. 
Customs and traditions 
L2.1 Legal Regime Public transport legislation 
L2.2 
Institutional environment 
Formal rules of the game Regulatory Regime 
Regulation enacted within the scope of the law 
L3 Governance The play of the game 
Governance 
Choices of organisational form by transport authorities within 
the scope of laws and regulations 
L4 Resource allocation Decisions on contracts, etc 
Contract 
Choices of incentives in relations between authorities and 
operators, within the scope of the chosen organisational form 
We believe that the developments taking place in the Dutch competitive tendering and 
concession practice provide, by their width of experience, a particularly useful bench-
mark in an international context. Furthermore, the recent evolutions in these practices, 
at levels L3 and L4 and the relation to the failures and successes that lay behind them, 
can provide precious information to other authorities contemplating the introduction of 
competitive tendering regimes that go further than simple gross-cost route-by-route con-
tracts. 
This section of the paper will make an analysis of the main findings from the case stud-
ies presented above with a specific focus on the shifts in allocation of the tactical level 
between authority and operator. It should be noted that the analysis made here is pre-
liminary to a wider study reviewing such shifts, as well as contractual and other institu-
tional evolutions in the Netherlands and in other countries. In a number of cases, addi-
tional research is needed to draw firmer conclusions. 
4.1 Variety of configurations achieved within the institutional setting at level L2 
A first fundamental observation concerns the variation of organisational settings that 
can currently be observed in the Netherlands at the levels L3 and L4. 
It is remarkable to note that several transport authorities have managed to realize a wide 
variety of interesting tendering processes and contracts from the point of view of giving 
to operators substantial freedom to determine the transport services provided (transfer of 
the ‘tactical level’ to the operator). What is peculiar about this experience is that it has 
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proven possible to realise this despite the fact that negotiations are prohibited within the 
tendering procedure5. 
A further analysis is needed to evaluate the potential impact and necessity for a possibil-
ity of negotiation. Such negotiations are common in the French regime, but currently 
also in the Copenhagen contracts, even though it is based on rather simple gross-cost, 
route-by-route contracts. Note that the current European proposals for a new Regulation 
in this sector also includes the possibility for negotiation. 
4.2 Conflicting rationalities 
The frictions that appeared within the transition from a situation of concessions awarded 
without competition to a situation of competitively tendered concessions can illustrate 
some interesting behavioural differences pertaining to the attitude to contracts by au-
thority and operator. The following examples are illustrating: 
● In the Northern provinces the operator acted according to the letter of the contract. 
He paid fines were appropriate and only took measures to avoid fines when this was 
viable from an economic point of view. The authorities had expected that the opera-
tor would improve its performance in all cases instead of adopting such an economic 
driven approach.  
● In North-Brabant, the option to extend the concession was not granted as threshold 
values stated in the concession were not reached. The operator had not expected this 
decision as several of these values were partly out of the influence of the operator 
(such as passenger growth). 
It is indeed simple to say that this could have been foreseen, as pacta sunt servanda, or 
that the parties to the contract should have known better. It is, nevertheless, illustrative 
of the mindset that is (still?) present in the sector on both sides of the table, and of the 
learning process that is still required. Note that similar frictions or misunderstanding 
appeared in the case of the net-cost tactical contract in Helsingborg (Sweden) a few 
years ago. 
As for any commercial company, turnover, return and continuity are essential motiva-
tions. The danger is that the operator engages in strategic behaviour and misuse of its 
freedom in the eye of the authority. It is therefore essential, when using a more func-
tional approach to tendering and contracting, to use the right steering elements both at 
the moment of tendering and for the whole contract period. The main challenge is to 
stimulate the operator to develop the desired behaviour and to punish unwanted behav-
iour. The set of contract parameters and its calibration are indeed essential elements in 
the success such approach. Further analysis on the bonus/malus arrangements and other 
incentives used in the contracts should be carried out to be able to draw further conclu-
sions on the adequacy of the contracts as implemented in the Netherlands until now.  
 
5 The Netherlands have chosen for the rather strict service tendering procedure according to Directive 92/50. 
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4.3 Appearance of the tactical level as a separate institution  
The disappointments or misunderstandings presented in the previous point lead in some 
cases to a shift towards more control on the tactical level by the authorities at the next 
tendering round. This happened in various forms. We saw in the GGD-case that tactical 
powers were shifted to the authorities’ side that developed a specific bureau to carry out 
the tasks. North-Brabant, on the contrary, decided to contract it out separately from the 
operations. In the case of South-Holland, the evolution of contracting practice indicates 
a pursued allocation of the tactical function to the operator, but under a much stricter 
monitoring by the authority, including a separate budgeting. 
This illustrates that similar disappointments lead to different reactions. One of the inter-
viewed civil servants pointed to the fact that most authorities actually want the operator 
to develop the network, and would rather avoid doing it themselves. But in practice, he 
observed that it is very difficult to make the operators change things, and indeed in 
many cases nothing happens. Another observed that the developments in North Brabant 
and GGD are strikingly similar, although the current practices are seemingly different. 
The absence of a separate public transport bureau in North Brabant is the result of the 
fact that no inter-authority co-operation is needed in this Province. 
It also illustrates that different reactions can lead to similar new markets. Another inter-
esting observation out of the recent experience is that different authority reactions, such 
as outsourcing network design as in North Brabant and determining a separate network 
development budget as in South Holland, both lead to the appearance of a new market 
for service design. In this case, Connexxion develops a subsidiary that is selling services 
both to North Brabant and to Connexxion in the case of South Holland. Connexxion is 
reported to be happy about this development as this helps to upkeep these planning 
competences in the industry. So, ironically, seemingly opposite movements as to the 
allocation of the tactical function lead to the appearance of a similar separate so-called 
network architect. The main difference is that the control on the actions of the archi-
tect—and this is the core of the entrepreneurial function—rests entirely with the author-
ity in North Brabant while it rests with the operator in South Holland.  
The South Holland case nevertheless illustrates a tendency to a growing involvement of 
authorities in tactical issues. One could say that this is ‘only one finger in the machine’, 
and not steering the machine directly as in GGD or indirectly as in North Brabant. The 
future will show whether this approach or that currently attempted in North Holland will 
prove to be more successful. 
4.4 A probabilistic view on the realization of the legislator’s dream 
The general idea of the new passenger transport legislation was that operators could get 
concessions including a large degree of freedom of service design under the general 
control—at arm’s length—by the transport authority. Several authorities tried to imple-
ment this approach, but this proved to be more difficult than anticipated. One of the 
difficulties was to define clear criteria for awarding concessions. Experiences showed 
that bids—as could be expected—focussed on the awarding criteria as formulated in the 
call for tender rather than on overall quality per se. An example is the usage as an 
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evaluation criterion of the number of bus kilometres supplied: chances of winning could 
be increased by increasing the production of cheap bus-kilometres at times and places 
where there was very little demand, whereby the incentives given to the bidders were 
perceived to be—and were—quite remote from the general interest.  
The tactical function is given to the operator in only in a minority of the recent proce-
dures. In the majority of cases there is a strong control by the authority at the tendering 
stage, although in some cases more freedom is given to the operator in a later stage of 
the concession (as the first tendering round in South Holland). In view of this and of the 
cases presented in this paper, we believe there is a rather high probability that the gen-
eral path that will be taken by most authorities in the Netherlands will no be that cur-
rently taken by North Holland. 
This development is very much at odds with the ideas propagated by the Brokx Com-
mittee and on which the current reform is based. We believe the low probability of see-
ing the regime develop in the direction that was recommended by the Brokx vision is 
linked to the ‘psychology’ of the actor at the level of the local or regional transport au-
thority. On the basis of the current experience, we tend to believe that on the whole, 
civil servants—perhaps more at this level than at the national level—are more likely to 
exhibit a risk-averse behaviour than to behave like entrepreneurs. The approach taken in 
North Holland appears to be an exception and requires the availability of policy makers 
with a broad field of competence and the availability of project managers that have ade-
quate understanding of both content and process. They must be able to develop and im-
plement policies in co-operation with parties located outside the civil service, have ade-
quate communication skills with the partners present in this field, and also have an in-
novative approach to an authority’s action in this field. This specific mindset can cer-
tainly not be assumed to be absent from the local or regional authority level, but it is 
very unlikely to be present everywhere. In short, the probability to see the dream of the 
legislator come true is low, but certainly not zero. 
All in all, one could say that the architects of the reform paid too little attention to the 
behavioural/human aspects of the local authority and looked at the transformation too 
much from their own reference framework. They have not sufficiently tried to transpose 
themselves in the mental and behavioural world of civil servants at the local and re-
gional level. 
4.5 Mutual learning and policy needs 
Transport authorities learn from the experience gathered in earlier tendering rounds, but 
do not seem to learn very much from each other. Knowledge management and knowl-
edge exchange seems to be undervalued. Past experiences—especially failures in con-
tractual relations with operators—seem to be largely determinant, but some authorities 
tend to oversimplify their analysis. Causes and consequences are not always clearly 
distinguished when conclusions are drawn from experiences to date. The disappoint-
ment over the behaviour of the operator in South Holland and North Brabant could be 
seen as part of a learning curve, but also as the consequence of a rather naïve perception 
of the behavioural grounds of private sector companies. 
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Improvements in future tendering rounds require from the authorities the ability and the 
readiness to question their own behaviour. The ‘corporate culture’ required for this is 
not necessarily present within all authorities concerned. An additional problem is that of 
the building of adequate expertise on the side of the authority. Whereas some authority 
prefer to organise the competitive tendering in house, others sub-contract most or all 
activities to consultants. The first option bears the risk is missing useful insights and of 
a long learning curve, the second offers better chances for success but bears the risk of 
an insufficient build up of competences leading to rather conservative (risk averse) 
choices in type of organisational forms. 
A fundamental issue for the future of the Dutch regime is whether new policy measures 
are needed to bring the current development to a good end. If the aim is to ensure that 
operators carry the tactical level and not only the authorities, then it will be necessary to 
ensure that operators are able to fulfil this task. In this case it will not be sufficient if 
only 10 or 15% of the authorities engage in this path (seen from a probabilistic point of 
view). This is presumably insufficient a market size to ensure that several competitors 
develop the necessary skills to carry this function. This would then only result in further 
disappointment of those authorities who have tried to transfer this powers to the opera-
tors, and ultimately to further concentration of the tactical level on the side of the au-
thority. 
4.6 The near future: funding arrangements and awarding mechanisms 
One of the particularities of the Dutch experience is the selection mechanism based 
upon fixed budgets and/or supply maximization. Local authorities have no local taxation 
power and all public transport subsidization budgets come from central government. 
The decentralization of public transport responsibilities to the provinces—contrary to 
the experience of several other countries—did not involve in the Netherlands any true 
decentralized funding of public transport. Central government funding was replaced by 
central government transfers to regional transport authorities. These then have to be 
spent on public transport or are foregone. 
The result of this funding arrangement is that transport authorities experience no incen-
tives to minimize their public transport spending in the period studied. The allocated 
budget has to be spent and competitive tendering is used as a mechanism to maximize 
production under specified public service obligations. The simple cost-cutting experi-
ence of some Scandinavian practices is therefore avoided. It should be noted, though, 
that supply maximization provides no guarantee for welfare optimization. It does, how-
ever, provide other interesting opportunities for allowing operators to carry the tactical 
function (service re-design). The example of North Holland shows that this funding 
arrangement allows to separate the ‘social’ from the ‘commercial’ by allowing the au-
thority to define the minimum services (‘social function’ or public service obligation) 
while the operator can focus on the commercial part (i.e. maximize revenue with the 
remaining subsidy after providing the socially required services) without requirement 
for the authority to be involved in the detail of network design or selection. 
Recently introduced new funding arrangements are likely to lead to a change in selec-
tion mechanisms where supply maximization will loose in importance. In the new fund-
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ing arrangement, several central government transfers for road investment and man-
agement and for public transport are bundled into a single transfer for transport that can 
be freely allocated by the provinces to either transport infrastructure investments or to 
operations of public transport. Because of this savings achieved in the public transport 
sector will now be ‘reallocatable’ to other items of the provincial transport policy. It is 
however too early to see all consequences of these new arrangements. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The cases presented showed a wide variety of arrangements at the levels L3 and L4 and 
the location of the tactical level within level L4 shows the most interesting changes in 
the Netherlands. 
A main issue for the future is whether the practice across the country converge towards 
some common model. Will there be a tendency for the authorities to entangle ‘their fin-
gers in the machinery’ or will the dream of the legislator come true? The current obser-
vations of the analysed cases, but also taking into account the rest of current practices in 
the Netherlands, seems to indicate a strong and/or probably growing involvement of the 
authorities at the tactical level; which also entails a substantial monitoring need. But it is 
too early to predict the outcome of the current learning process; many of the interesting 
new concessions, such as North Holland, South Holland or North Brabant, still have to 
start operating. It is only after a few years that will become more apparent whether this 
tendency is confirmed and whether it is the result of some intrinsic feature of the current 
regime at level L2, or whether it was only a temporary behavioural feature that could be 
overcome by emulation. The future will also tell whether the institutional setting proves 
fit to find the right balance at levels L3 and L4 between the equally undesirable ex-
tremes of uncontrolled central planning with route operators and ineffectively controlled 
network concessionaires. 
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